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AGRICULTURAL RISK MANAGEMENT IN EUROPE 
 




This paper is based on a study performed by the IPSC-Agrifish unit of Joint Research Centre 
(JRC) of the European Commission for DG Agriculture under request of the European 
Parliament.  Most information comes from fact sheets collected by experts or consultants in 
the different countries.  
The definitions of crisis and disaster eligible for public aid in EU member states are analysed 
and compared with the “Community guidelines for state aid in the agriculture sector” (EC, 
2000). New Commission Guidelines and a new Regulation have been adopted in December 
2006. 
The paper makes a review of the agricultural risks management systems in Europe (EU27) 
with a special focus on agricultural insurances. The different types of agricultural insurance 
systems in Europe and key figures in each country are analysed. Some technicalities like 
reinsurance, triggers and deductibles are described. The relationship between Government 
involvement and insurance development is highlighted. Usually, private companies insure 
only hail and fire, but as the government involvement in insurance increases, more 
comprehensive coverage is provided by the insurance system, becoming possible the insuring 
of agricultural systemic risks.   
The role of Governments is analyzed for every country: offering or subsidising insurances and 
providing aid ex-post. Aid related to risks in agriculture is also given on an ad-hoc basis or 
through compensation schemes or calamity funds, which can be partially financed by the 
agricultural sector on a voluntary or compulsory basis. Payments ad-hoc and from calamity 
funds in most European countries are summarised and their levels are compared.  
The existing insurance level is generally insufficient to smooth significant income reduction 
in bad years. Risk management tools available in the MS could be developed further. 
However, given the heterogeneous situation, the interest of a harmonised EU-wide system of 
agricultural insurances is debatable. Conditions for a feasible EU-wide insurance scheme are 
analysed and classified into a) decisions of the policy makers (political criteria); b) decisions 
of the private sector: insurers, re-insurers and farmers (socio-economic criteria); c) technical 
conditions. Last, the possible amount of costs of an EU-supported insurance system has been 
roughly quantified for a few hypothetical scenarios, under given assumptions.  
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1 Introduction 
The economic stability of an entire rural area can be jeopardized by crises caused by different 
types of natural disasters, from climatic events to livestock or plant diseases. Weather risks 
are a major source of uncertainty for farms. Drought or excess rain is responsible for bad 
harvests all over the world. Besides, it seems that the volatility of temperature and 
precipitation weather and the occurrence of extreme weather events increased in the last 
decade and are likely to continue increasing due to global climate changes. This leads to 
destabilization of farm incomes in particular in countries with strong yield variability. 
Climatic risks are more important for crops and sanitary risks are more important for 
livestock, but none of them are exclusive: pests can have a considerable impact on crops and a 
bad climatology can make strong damages on livestock farming through the pastures or 
forage availability. 
The economic situation of farms can be subject to strong variability due to other reasons:  
•  Policy reforms, marked by trade agreements and market liberalisation and the 
consequent reduction of prices paid to farmers.  
•  An unbalanced relationship between retailers, generally well organised to put a strong 
pressure on prices and farmers.   
•  Sanitary measures and risk of animal diseases.  
 
Producers can try to compensate the negative economic consequences of bad weather events 
by buying insurance, but also, since the mid-nineties a new class of instruments, namely 
weather derivatives. Generally speaking, weather derivatives are index based weather 
insurance are financial instruments that allow to trade weather related risks. However, in 
Europe traditional crop insurances and calamities funds are the most used tools to manage 
climatic risks. Some countries have decided to help the stabilization of their agriculture by 
supporting the agricultural insurance schemes. 
 
The aim of the study is to improve the knowledge about climatic and sanitary risks in EU 
agriculture and to examine the role and the functioning of agricultural insurance as a risk 
management tool. Weather risk is a major challenge in agricultural policy, and it is important 
to have a new look at it providing suitable information to analyse a possible integration in the 
Common Agricultural Policy. Sanitary crises and also economic crises caused by the changes 
of market conditions may also endanger farm's viability. The CAP should enhance 
appropriate risk and crisis management strategies, providing an improved response to crises in 
the agricultural sector. 
 
2 Policy  framework 
2.1 WTO  Agreements 
Public aids in agriculture have to comply with the WTO agreements, which classify 
agricultural aids into three boxes: Green, Blue and Amber.  
The Blue Box contains aids for goods that have a production limitation (e.g. milk in the EU) 
The Green Box defines other aids that do not distort trade: For Income insurance and income 
safety-nets, aid is admitted when the income loss (…) exceeds 30 per cent of average gross 
income or the equivalent in net income terms (…) in the preceding three-year period or a 
three-year average based on the preceding five-year period, excluding the highest and the 
lowest entry.  The amount of such payments shall compensate for less than 70 per cent of the 
producer's income loss in the year (…). Programs based on farmers’ income are not frequent.   4
Canada notified one program. Payments for relief from natural disasters (directly or by 
subsidies to crop insurance) also fall in the Green Box if there is a formal recognition by 
government authorities that a natural or like disaster (    ) with a production loss which 
exceeds 30 per cent of the average of production in the preceding three-year period or a 
three-year average based on the preceding five-year period, excluding the highest and the 
lowest entry. Agricultural insurances are mentioned, but mostly ad-hoc payments are notified, 
because one of the main reasons that make subsidies to insurance not eligible for the green 
box is that they do not follow a formal recognition by government authorities of the natural 
disaster. Such recognition is not operational in an insurance model managed by private 
companies. Other reasons often exist but do not apply to all types of insurance products (e.g. 
30% threshold or being product-specific). 
The Amber Box contains other support measures to agriculture. Aids in the amber box which 
exceed the “de minimis” limits (5% of agricultural production for developed countries, 10% 
for developing countries) are subject to reduction commitments. Most of the subsidies to crop 
insurances have been notified within the Amber box.  
 
2.2  The definition of crises and disaster and EU- regulations on state aids 
The definition of crisis and disaster is rather generic. More precise conditions can be found to 
authorise state aids in case of disaster or adverse weather conditions. In general an official 
declaration of disaster is needed. At national level such a declaration by the government is 
usually quick. A potential EU-wide regulation should define the competent body to make a 
declaration of disaster.  
Article 87 of the EC Treaty authorises certain State aids, more precisely defined in the 
“Community guidelines for state aid in the agriculture sector” (EC, 2000), generally followed 
by MSs. These guidelines state that adverse weather conditions (hail, drought, frost, rain, etc.) 
on agricultural production may be assimilated to natural disaster (like earthquakes, 
avalanches, landslides and floods) if the damage is more than 20% of normal production in 
the less-favoured areas and 30% in other areas. Aids in case of animal and plant diseases are 
permitted normally as a part of an appropriate programme for prevention, control or 
eradication. In general, all aids in these circumstances may be granted up to 100% of actual 
costs. Insurance premiums may be subsidized up to 80% when insurance covers natural 
disasters, or assimilated events. If the insurance covers other losses, the maximum aid is 50% 
of the premium.  
New Commission Guidelines and a new Regulation on the application of Articles 87 and 88 
of the Treaty have been adopted in December 2006. The definitions adopted have been 
strongly shaped by the WTO Agreements. 
The main changes added by this Regulation in the field of risk management aids in agriculture 
related to climatic risks, besides the fact of being a Regulation and not only Guidelines, can 
be summarised in the following: 
•  Adverse climatic events (Art. 11) can be assimilated to natural disasters when they 
exceed the threshold of 30%, but there is no more the 20% threshold for less favoured 
areas. The compensation cannot exceed 80% of the losses and 90% in less favoured 
areas (formerly 100%), what means that additional to the threshold there is a 
deductible. 
•  It sets as a condition for losses suffered after 2010 in case of adverse climatic events: 
compensation must be reduced by 50% unless it is given to farmers who have taken 
out insurance covering at least 50% of there average annual production or production-
related income and the statistically most frequent climatic risks in the Member State 
or region concerned.   5
•  There are no changes on the aids to the payment of insurance premiums (Art. 12), 
 
Member States keep several types of positions on State Aids for exceptional climatic events:  
•  Most of the countries apply the “Community Guidelines”, with explicit mention in 
their legislation (Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Slovenia), or without explicit mention (Finland, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Spain) 
•  Other MS have more restrictive criteria: Austria, France, Portugal, Romania 
•  Bulgaria, Czech Republic and Hungary seem to have a broader definition.  
•  Some countries simply do not give any aids to agriculture for climatic events, but have 
compensation programs for livestock diseases (Netherlands, Sweden, UK) 
Some of the countries have the constraint to aids given in case of crisis or disaster that it must 
not be due to an insurable risk (see 6 “Funds and ad-hoc aids”). 
If a common EU definition for natural disaster were to be applied to all member countries, it 
could consider:  
•  Exceptional character of the climatic phenomenon 
•  Minimal number of farms or surface should be affected, and thresholds for losses at 
crop level and/or at farm level (already existing in the Guidelines).  
•  A fast procedure for an official declaration.  
•  Exclusion if efficient preventive techniques or developed insurances are available. 
 
3  Risk management tools 
3.1  Risk management tools in agriculture 
Tools for risk management in agriculture can be either on-farm strategies (diversification of 
production programmes, stabilization or self-insurance funds, etc.) either risk-sharing 
strategies like marketing contracts, production contracts, hedging on futures markets, or the 
participation in insurance, mutual insurance or regional mutual schemes. Government 
involvement when these strategies are not enough often takes place ex-post through the form 
of ad-hoc aids or the organization of compensation schemes.  
In Europe the main risk-sharing tools for risk management in agriculture are calamities 
funds, regional mutual schemes, and insurance. Calamities funds are usually regulated by 
the Governments and they are described on section 6.  
Regional mutual schemes (also called mutual insurance funds) refer to the funds owned by 
the participants and organized at micro (regional) level. The advantage of the regional 
organisation is that farmers organise their own cross-control reducing moral hazard and 
adverse selection. The disadvantage of these funds is the danger that many or even all farmers 
incur losses at the same time. On the other hand farmers are not always sufficiently organised 
to set up an efficient mutual scheme structure. Solutions for this problem are re-insurance or 
the cooperation with mutual schemes in other regions which would cover a share of the loss. 
Many regional mutual schemes enlarge and evolve in time to become mutual insurance 
companies (similar to profit-oriented insurance companies but non-profit and partially owned 
by farmers).  
Insurance is probably the best known risk pooling tool. Two basic requirements, among 
others, have to be met for a risk to be insurable: managing the adverse effects of “asymmetric   6
information” and overcoming the implications of “systemic risks” (a lot of people suffer a 
loss at the same time). Natural disasters or epizootic diseases cause special problems for 
insurance because of the systemic nature of these risks.  
If re-insurance or state guarantees are not available, the nature of the systemic risks makes it 
necessary for an insurance company to charge very high premiums which can be unaffordable 
for farmers, and to build up substantial capital reserves. This means that comprehensive 
agricultural insurances schemes need a strong support from the public sector to provide broad 
coverage at an affordable price for the farmer. On the other hand, if governments provide ad-
hoc disaster payments, it stifles the development of insurance products.  
 
3.2.  Risk Management tools for livestock 
Livestock main risks are sanitary risks, and they are mostly managed within disease 
eradication programs at European and/or national level. DG SANCO of European 
Commission has undertaken an in-depth study on the risk management tools for livestock 
sanitary crisis. The main report of the study (BIELZA ET AL. 2006) offers a summary of the 
conclusions reached. 
Livestock epidemics can result in substantial losses for farmers and all the other participants 
in the livestock production chain involved. Member states are obliged to apply the control 
measures established in EU directives if an outbreak of ‘List diseases’ arises (Office 
International des Epizooties, 1998). Recently, the European Commission (EC, 2006b) has 
approved a financial package of €193 million to support programmes to eradicate, control and 
monitor animal diseases during the year 2007. The 155 programs which were selected for EU 
funding will deal with animal diseases that impact both human and animal health. The large 
EU contribution towards these programmes reflects the high level of importance attached to 
disease eradication measures, for the protection of both animal and public health. 
In the livestock sector, there is a different treatment for direct losses and for consequential 
losses. MS Governments and European Institutions generally support the largest part of the 
direct losses due to mortality or morbidity, such as the value of destroyed animals. Some 
member states finance the non-EU compensated direct losses from the national budget 
(Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and United 
Kingdom). Other member states have set up some form of statutory system to co-finance the 
direct losses. These Public-Private financing schemes have a compulsory fund structure in 
which all farmers pay a tax (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, The Netherlands).  
Consequential losses, such as losses resulting from empty buildings and movement 
standstills, are most often completely borne by the farmers themselves. Some EU member 
states partly compensate consequential losses in a form of ad-hoc relief program (Austria, 
Belgium, Ireland, etc) or by compensating above the value of the animals which are forcibly 
slaughtered to cover part of the consequential losses. In some other EU member states the 
absence of public assistance has led to the creation of private insurance schemes for 
consequential losses for some types of livestock production (Germany, Italy, Netherlands, 
Sweden and United Kingdom). There are also some forms of public-private partnership in 
which the government acts either as an insurer or a re-insurer of a subsidised consequential 
loss insurance policy (Greece and Spain). However, producers do not commonly take up 
private policies that are specifically designed to cover consequential losses.  
 
Private insurance exists in many countries for non-epidemic diseases and accidents (see 
section 4.4.  
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4 Agricultural  insurance  systems 
4.1 Definitions 
The most widely extended crop insurance in the EU is hail insurance, which often includes 
other scattered risks such as fire (single risk insurance). In many countries this is nearly the 
only existing type of crop insurance. Some kind of insurance policies cover also the risk of 
frost or a limited number of meteorological events. These are known as combined risk 
insurance. 
We call “yield insurance” the type of policy that covers yield losses for a given crop due to 
the major meteorological events affecting the production (plant diseases and plagues usually 
not covered). In general all the fields of a farm with the same crop have to be insured. We 
avoid here the term “multi-risk” or “multi-peril crop insurance (MPCI)” because it is 
sometimes applied to combined insurances and sometimes to yield insurances (USA). In 
European yield insurances, the meteorological origin of the damage has to be identifiable, 
while the US “Multiple Peril Crop Insurance” (MPCI) includes yield losses by plagues and 
diseases and damages are calculated simply as the difference between guaranteed and actual 
yield: The European system has higher loss-adjustment costs, but it helps to avoid moral-
hazard, one of the big problems for the US insurance system.  
Whole-farm yield insurance covers to all the crops produced by the farm. A yield reduction 
in one crop will not be compensated by the insurer if the global production reduction of the 
farm does not reach the trigger.   
Revenue insurance combines yield and price insurance. The farmer is paid if the total value 
of his production falls below a threshold. Income insurance takes also into account the costs 
of production; it is only applied in USA but not in Europe.  
All the former types of insurance are based on the results of the individual farms and losses 
are adjusted on the field and the total losses are most often calculated at the farm level. 
However,  index insurances are based on an index common for an area. In area-yield 
insurance, the compensation paid to the farmer (and the trigger) depend on the statistical 
yield for the year in a predefined area, usually an administrative unit. Area-revenue 
insurance is based on the area yield multiplied by the area price. If the average yield/revenue 
in that area is below a certain threshold, all the insured farmers in the area are compensated. 
Indirect-index insurance does not refer to the average yield in an area but to a 
meteorological indicator or satellite images. Weather derivatives can be included in this 
category of insurances.  
 
4.2  Technicalities in agricultural insurance 
The technicalities or technical characteristics of agricultural insurance should aim to provide 
an actuarially sound system. Their proper use in insurance design can avoid moral hazard 
and adverse selection. Adverse selection means a situation in which the insured farmer only 
insures the part of the farm with a higher risk, or in which only farmers with higher risks get 
insured. This can happen because the farmer has more detailed information about his or her 
risk of loss than does the insurance provider. As a consequence, the level of risk in the insured 
population is higher than in the total population (HARWOOD ET AL 1999). Moral hazard refers 
to an individual’s change in behaviour after having taken out an insurance policy. The change 
in behaviour results in an increase in the potential magnitude and/or probability of a loss. 
Some technicalities can also make risks in agriculture - in particular systemic risks (risks 
affecting a big population at the same time) -on the one hand insurable to the insurer and, on 
the other hand, affordable to the farmers.  
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Deductibles and insurance coverage: 
The coverage level refers to the proportion of the insured value that is effectively covered by 
insurance. The threshold or trigger is the percentage of the insured value the losses must 
exceed in order to trigger the payment. Once this value is exceeded, the payment of the 
indemnity can take place for the entire loss or only for a part of it, if there is a deductible (the 
portion of an insured loss to be borne by the insured). The losses on which the different 
deductibles are to be applied can be evaluated per field, per crop (all fields with the same crop 
on the farm), or even per farm in whole-farm insurance products.  
In general deductibles in crop insurance range from 10% to 30%, some times up to 50% 
depending on the contract and premium rate.  
Bonus/malus system 
The bonus-malus system or system of deductions and penalties on the premiums due to 
former results is also used to avoid moral hazard and adverse selection problems. 
Premium rates 
Premium rates vary a lot, depending on many factors. Besides the geographical variability 
inside each country, which has associated different levels of risks, there is a high variability of 
the insurance products offered across Europe, which cover different risks and crops.  
Among others, in general the magnitude of premium rates in crop insurance depends on: 
•  The frequency of adverse events. 
•  The type of risk (e.g. hail as a very local risk, drought as a large area risk) 
•  The sensitiveness of crops  
•  The number of risks covered (single- risk, combined-, yield insurance) 
•  The number of insured farms, to spread the risks  
•  Technicalities like deductibles 
The premium rates in yield insurance for arable crops vary from 3-8%. The highest premium 
rates are obtained for fruits, in average 8-14%, but in some regions rates up to 20% are 
possible. 
Re-insurance 
There are two main types of re-insurance in agricultural insurance: non-proportional (stop 
loss) reinsurance and proportional (quota share) reinsurance. 
Stop-loss: The re- insurer takes charge of the losses above a fixed threshold of the annual 
balance (annual loss or loss ratio) of the insurance company. 
Quota-share reinsurance: The re-insurer assumes a set percentage of risk (covered sum 
insured) for the same percentage of the premium, minus an allowance for the ceding 
company's expenses. Or, what has a similar result, the re-insurer takes charge of a percentage 
of the loss of the company, and the same share on the profit.  
In Europe the most frequent form of re-insurance is a combination of both types and almost in 
all countries it is made in the international re-insurance market (for some exceptions see 
section 5.2).  
 
4.3  Main types of crop insurance in EU-27 
Table 1 shows different types of agricultural insurance systems in Europe, their level of 
penetration and key figures in each country. Single-risk (mainly hail) insurance is well 
developed with a long history. It exists in almost all European countries. Usually, private 
companies insure only hail and fire, but as the government involvement in insurance increases 
in some MS, more comprehensive coverage can be provided by the private insurance. So   9
there is in general a direct relationship between public support and the level of insurance 
development. 
Single- risk insurance  
For Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and UK hail insurance or single-risk insurances are 
the main products available. Probably there is no broad coverage provided in these countries 
because of the missing public support to insurance.  
In some northern countries, including the Baltic States, there is less demand of crop insurance 
or they are starting to develop their systems (Latvia and Lithuania).  
In Finland private crop insurance is less developed, but there is a public “Crop Compensation 
Scheme” provided to compensate yield losses after natural disasters.  
Combined- risk insurance 
In Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden, 
single and combined risk insurance is available. Only hail and a few additional risks like fire, 
frost, rain and wind are covered. The coverage against drought, as one of the most difficult 
insurable systemic risk (because a large area can be affected) is usually not included in 
combined risk insurance, whereas it is usually in the wide coverage against all climatic risks 
of yield insurance. 
The schemes in Greece and Cyprus are different: a compulsory insurance system is provided 
by the public sector. 
Yield insurance 
In Spain the Government collaborates with farm unions and insurance companies to run the 
system. All the insurance companies operate in a pool, in a co-insurance regime. Most risks 
are covered in yield insurance policies.  
In other countries such as Austria, France, Italy, and Luxembourg the insurance system also is 
well developed and most climatic risks are covered depending on the contracts. Mostly there 
is a basic coverage for hail and in addition yield insurance covering the most important risks.  
Index insurance 
Regarding indirect index insurance, we have only found three examples in Europe.  
In Spain an insurance product for pastures is available since 2001, based on vegetation indices 
computed on coarse resolution satellite images.  
In United Kingdom an index-based insurance programme was launched in 1998 based upon 
the yield statistics of the Home Grown Cereals Authority and prices based upon the LIFFE 
commodity futures. The cover provided indemnity for a 10% fall in yield and a 5% fall in 
price. Take up was minimal and the product offering was cancelled in the following season. 
In Austria an indirect index insurance based on meteorological data for the coverage of arable 
crops against drought risk has been commercialized for the first time in 2007.  
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Austria  PS  PS  PS  78%  1,054 52,0  2.6% 32,0  24 (46) 
Belgium  P -  - n.d. n.d.  49,0 n.d. n.d.  0 
Bulgaria  P  P - 52%  1,276 6,6  4.8% 4,5  0 
Cyprus  GC  GC -  (100%)  112 8,7  7.2% 4,5  4,4  (50) 
Czech Rep.  PS  PS -  35%  1,074 32,0  1.8% 24,0 7  (30) 
Denmark  P -  - n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.  0 
Estonia  P   -  -  <1% n.d.  0,1 n.d. n.d.  0 
Finland  P   P   -  <1% n.d.  1,8 n.d.  1,1  0 
France  P  P  PS  n.d. 3,507 211,0 1.7%  n.d.  5  (2.4) 
Germany  P -  -  43% 7,265 129,2 1.2% 104,5  0 
Greece  P  GC+GS+G  -  (100%) n.d. n.d.  2.5-3%  218,0  n.d. 
Hungary  P  P - 52% n.d.  43,5 n.d.  30,7  0 
Ireland  P -  - n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.  0 
Italy  PS  PS  PS  8%  976 271,2 7.4% 166,2  180  (67) 
Latvia  PS - - <1% n.d.  0,1 n.d. n.d.  0,05  (50) 
Lithuania  PS - -  1%  9 1,1  4.3% 1.1  0,55  (50) 
Luxembourg  PS  PS  PS  45%  26 1,3  2.3% 1.0  0,65  (50) 
Netherlands  P -  - n.d. n.d.  75,0 n.d.  30,7  0 
Poland  P(S#) -  -  7% n.d.  9,9 n.d.  6,3  0 
Portugal  PS  PS -  22%  298 46,9  8.4% 30,2  32  (68) 
Romania  PS  PS -  12% 812  14,0 n.d.  4,4  7  (50) 
Slovakia  PS  PS -  n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.  (50) 
Slovenia  PS  P - 17% n.d.  9,5  7.6%  13,8  4,3  (45) 
Spain  PS  PS  PS  26% 5,850 564,7 6.3% 388,3  232  (41) 
Sweden  P  P - 60%  1,500 n.d. n.d. n.d.  0 
UK  P -  -  7% 370  11,1  0.8% n.d.  0 
TOTAL          1,538   1,061  497  (32) 
 
Legend: 
- : Not existing 
n.d.: no data 
#: Pilot experience 
S : Subsidized  
P : Private non-subsidized 
PS : Private partially subsidized 
G : Public non-subsidized 
GS : Public partially subsidized 
GC : Public compulsory partially subsidized 
Source: Prepared from information in the fact sheets provided by the experts in each country 
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Source: Own representation, prepared from information in the fact sheets   12
 
4.4 Livestock  Insurances 
 
Livestock main risks, sanitary risks are mostly managed within disease eradication programs 
at national and/or European level. However, non-epidemic diseases, accidents, and 
catastrophic climatic events can also have a direct impact on the animals (floods, etc.) and are 
susceptible to being insured. Last, other weather events can affect pasture and forage 
availability and therefore have an impact on the economic sustainability of the farm. The 
information collected on insurance available for accidents and some livestock diseases in the 
EU-27 countries is shown on annex 1.  
Pasture and forage availability can also be insured. Recently, a new livestock insurance 
product was introduced in Spain with the aim to prevent the effects of the possible decrease of 
pasture forage availability in case of adverse climate conditions. The aim of this kind of 
guarantee is to indemnify the farmer for the increase of his/her production price, due to the 
necessity of feeding the animals with different modalities. 
With this type of insurance farmers get a reimbursement when, due to bad climatic conditions 
(mainly drought), the forage present on the pasture is reduced compared to the normal 
production average in the correspondent area. This insurance system has a specific evaluation 
of damage; it is based on indirect indexes computed on satellite images. The currently used 
system in Spain is based on NDVI (Normalised Difference Vegetation Index). 
Aquaculture insurance is also available in some countries. It is developed mainly in Spain and 
in Greece (see annex 2). 
 
5  Public involvement to insurance 
5.1  Subsidies to insurance 
The amount of support provided by EU Member States to subsidize insurance premiums 
varies depending on the country’s policy to promote some particular type of coverage, to help 
some agricultural sub-sector or to facilitate some types of farms. Some countries have 
integrated it as an essential agricultural policy instrument for the stabilisation of agriculture 
income.  
Table 1 reports subsidies per country, where available. Some additional comments are:  
•  Italy: around 67% of total premium; 64% for the multi-peril yield-type product 
•  Spain: around 49% including the regional subsidies 
•  Austria: around 46% of total premium including regional subsidies; 50% for hail and 
frost 
•  France: The 2.5% average of three years is due to a majority of non-subsidised 
single-risk insurance. Since 2005 new yield insurance products have been launched 
with subsidies of 35% (40% for young farmers)  
•  Portugal: around 68% of total premium; subsidies vary from 35% to 75% 
•  Czech Republic: Subsidies from 15% for livestock to 30% for crop insurance  
•  Slovenia: Subsidies for crop insurance given the first time in 2006. 30 to 50% for the 
basic risk coverage (hail, fire and thunderstorm) 
•  Slovakia: 50% 
•  Romania: in 2005 the level rose from 20% to 50% 
•  Latvia and Lithuania: 50% subsidy, but still very low penetration of insurance. 
•  Cyprus: 50% for all insurable risks in the compulsory scheme    13
•  Luxembourg: 50% for all insurable risks  
The annual subsidies to agricultural insurance in EU are around 500 M€ (32% of premiums). 
The average amount of ad-hoc aids in EU is around 900 M€ (does not include all aids given 
for livestock).  
Most often, support to agricultural insurance comes directly from the national and/or regional 
budget. In some of these countries, it is not directly the Government by means of a Ministry, 
but a public institution, who manages the agricultural insurance-related affairs like in Spain, 
Italy, Greece and Cyprus. 
In those countries that also have funds, most often funds and insurance support are closely 
related, a part of the fund being used for subsidizing insurance premiums. This is the case for 
Austria, Italy, the Czech Republic since 2004 and to a minor extent in France. 
 
5.2 Public  re-insurance 
In most countries, reinsurance is undertaken by private companies. However, there are some 
exceptions in which insurance is totally or partially managed by the Government or public 
companies. It is the case for Portugal and to a minor extent in Spain and Italy. 
In Portugal, the main part of reinsurance is made through a public reinsurance system. It 
undertakes 85% of the losses above a certain threshold. The adhesion to this mechanism is 
voluntary but - up to date - all the insurance companies selling crop insurance have adhered to 
this system. 
In Spain, there is compulsory public reinsurance, undertaken by the Consorcio de 
Compensacion de Seguros. The CCS is a public company but it functions as a reinsurance 
company from a financial point of view. This public company is itself reinsured by 
international private companies. Also, private companies can freely reinsure the share of risk 
they assume through the international reinsurance market. 
In the case of Italy, there is a Public Fund of Reinsurance. It was introduced in order to help 
the development of the new multi-risk insurance products (and for the pluri-risk with more 
than a couple of perils included), so, it only works for these insurance types. It appeared in the 
2000 budget law, but its first year of implementation was 2004 (this delay was due to the 
notification to the EU). It works within the Reinsurance Plan (Ministerial Decree general for 
all reinsurance).  
 
5.3 Public  insurance 
In Greece the government operates a compulsory agricultural insurance scheme via the Greek 
Agricultural Insurance Organisation “ELGA”. ELGA does organise and implement 
programmes of proactive protection and insures the production in the crop and livestock 
sector. However, it does not seem to be a true insurance form an actuarial point of view, 
because premiums don’t discriminate insured crops or regions. Additionally, private insurance 
is provided for not covered risks. 
In Cyprus the crop insurance system is also public and compulsory, but there is no insurance 
for livestock available and no complementary insurance on the private sector for crops. 
 
6  Calamity funds and ad-hoc aids in Europe 
When there are no market based instruments available to manage risks such as insurance or 
regional mutual schemes, or complementary to these instruments when they are not enough,   14
aid is provided by the Governments in order to help farmers in case of calamities or natural 
catastrophes. 
In some countries, most of the risk management protection for crops is privately provided, 
while for animal diseases most often there is a Government intervention (this is the case for 
the Netherlands, Ireland, the United Kingdom, etc.). The rest of the countries give their aid to 
agricultural catastrophic losses by means of ad-hoc aids or through calamity funds.  
Aid-hoc aids or ex-post assistance in case of natural disaster usually cause big distortions in 
the national budget. For this reason, many countries create funds for risk management in 
agriculture. Usually these calamity funds have the purpose of accumulating money on a 
regular (yearly) basis for the years when it is necessary to provide assistance after a natural 
disaster. Some countries feed the funds entirely from the public budget, and others receive 
also contributions from the private sector, usually in the form of compulsory levies to 
production or levies to insurance premiums. All compensation payments from the funds aids 
are given under the declaration of catastrophe. The main advantage of the funds over ad-hoc 
aids is that they avoid big distortions of the government budget. Funds sometimes  
 
A key point for the development of agricultural insurances is whether or not the law forbids 
that ad-hoc measures or calamity funds compensate damages that could have been insured.  
In Austria, Spain, Greece and Sweden there are no payments from the public budget if there is 
insurance available. In Italy subsidized risks are excluded from public ad-hoc payments after 
natural disasters. In Romania and Portugal, disaster payments from the public budget are 
conditioned to farmers having bought some type of insurance. In France, payments include 
those damages for which there is no insurance at all or that insurance has not reached yet a 
significant diffusion level, independently of its being subsidized or not. In other countries 
there are no explicit regulations. 
 
Table 2:  Payments from calamity funds- and ad-hoc payments 









Austria 1995-04  55.9  5.6  Frost,  drought,  flood 
Belgium  1985-02  29.4  1.6  Frost, drought, rain, pests 
Belgium 1999 280  -  Livestock: dioxine (no average for the one 
time event used) !! 
Bulgaria  2000-04  2  0.4  Insect pest control fund & others 
Cyprus 2001-04  28.6  7.2  - 
Czech Rep.  1995-04  369.3  36.9  Flood, drought, frost 
Denmark  -  -  -  Storm & forest storm damage 
Estonia - 0 0  No  payments 
Finland  1996-05  114.2  11.4  Crop damage compensation scheme 
France 1996-05  1,555.8 
(1) 155.6 
(1)  Drought 67%, frost 19%, rain 13% 
Germany  - - -  no  data 
Greece  1995-04  701.0  70.1   -  
Hungary 1999-02 48.8  12.2  Frost,  drought 
Ireland 1999-04  400.6 
(1) 66.8 
(1) Livestock  disease 
Italy 2001-06  680.0  113.3  Drought and others not covered by 
insurance 
Latvia 2000-05  19.3 3.2  Frost,  drought,  rain 
Lithuania 2000-05  15.7  2.6  Frost,  drought,  rain 
Luxembourg  -  -  -  No ad-hoc aids for crops. No other data 
Netherlands  1998  250.0  -  Excessive rain; aids not allowed any more    15
Poland  -  10.0  10.0  Epidemic diseases   
Portugal  last 10 years  30.0
(2) 3.0
(2)   -  
Romania  last 5 years  56.8  11.4  Drought, frost, floods 
Slovakia  - - -  no  data 
Slovenia  1995-04  97.8  9.8  Drought, hail, frost 
Spain 2000-05  22.2 3.7  Frost,  drought,  rain 
Sweden  - - -  Infectious  diseases 
UK 2001-05  1,897.7  379.5 
Livestock disease (average without the high 
impact of 1.640 M€ in 2001 for foot and 
mouth disease would be 51.5 M€) !! 
TOTAL     904.3   
(1)
 The 50% of this amount comes from sector private contributions, through taxes on agricultural insurances (France) 
or from levies on the commercialization of the products (Ireland). 
(2) Portuguese farmers also contribute to the calamities fund at the moment of buying insurance with a 0,2% of the 
insured value, but the amount refers only to Government contributions  
Source: Prepared from information in the fact sheets provided by the experts in each country 
 
7  An EU-wide insurance scheme under debate 
We discuss some potential advantages, drawbacks and limitations of several options of EU-
wide agricultural insurance schemes. However any a priori feasibility assessment of a 
hypothetical EU-wide scheme of agricultural insurance has a large uncertainty. The most 
important source of uncertainty is probably the farmers’ behaviour.  
7.1 Alternative  options 
Risk management tools available in the MS could be developed further to improve 
sustainability of farms. However, given the big differences in the agricultural risks, legal, 
social and economic backgrounds in EU countries, an EU-wide system of agricultural 
insurances can be debatable. Alternatives to a common scheme based on existing systems 
could be easier to manage and control by the EU administration. An alternative to a proper 
EU-wide scheme can be a set of actions to foster national systems by:  
•  Facilitating/subsidizing the composition of yield/income databases, at a detailed level 
(farm): The use of databases can be considered as a basis for improving the premium 
rating, although some of these databases have important limitations due to confidentiality 
rules.  
•  Reinsuring: Public re-insurance exists in some MS and in the US. Budgetary uncertainty 
may be the strongest limitation to a hypothetical public participation of the EU in 
reinsurance.  
•  Clarifying the framework. The draft of “Commission Regulation (EC) No …/… on the 
application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to state aid to small and medium-sized 
enterprises active in the production of agricultural products and amending Regulation (EC) 
70/2001” is a significant step forward. To be mentioned in particular that, from 2010 
onwards, aid to compensate bad weather losses shall only be exempted if the farmer has 
also taken out insurance for at least 50% of his average annual production (EC, 2006a).   
•  Partially subsidizing national systems which are within the framework: This option would 
stimulate MS to enhance risk management tools, while keeping a flexibility to adapt better 
the needs in each country.  
 
7.2  The role of the public sector 
A clear role of the EU institutions is setting up a regulatory framework, which includes 
technical criteria such as eligible risks, minimum deductibles or reference product prices   16
allowed, etc. There is also a role on the control of the approved regulations. A question more 
open to debate is whether agricultural insurances should be subsidised by the CAP. One of the 
elements of this debate is the feasibility of purely private agricultural insurances with a wide 
coverage of risks. There are examples of totally private insurance in agriculture, covering in 
particular hail damage. Most other insurance schemes are provided under subsidised 
governmental schemes because the risks being covered are, in fact, not insurable in the sense 
that a market determined premium would be too high (MOREDDU, OCDE, 2001). In countries, 
such as Spain, Austria and Italy, with a strong public support to agricultural insurance, 
systemic risks tend to become insurable.  
 
7.3 Criteria  to  assess the feasibility 
A feasible EU-wide insurance scheme should ideally meet several conditions. Some of these 
conditions relate to decisions of the policy makers (political criteria); others relate to 
decisions of the private sector, insurers, re-insurers and farmers (socio-economic); a third 
category of conditions have a more technical nature. 
Political criteria  
•  Long term financial perspective: This condition depends on political decisions, but is 
obviously related with the possible cost of the system. Possible cost of different type of 
systems is considered later in technical criteria. A point that deserves in-depth debate is 
whether a hypothetical EU support to agricultural insurances can be framed in pillar 2 of 
the CAP, possibly through modulation. If introduced to the menu of rural development 
measures, these options would be available for Member States and regions to take up and 
use, according to their specific priorities for the next programming period. The causes of 
the weak development of market based risk management tools (insurance, futures market, 
contract farming) could be addressed by training measures within rural development 
programmes.  
•  Compatibility with WTO agreements and CAP: In general, the compatibility with the 
WTO and with the European legislation could be guaranteed for most tools if they meet the 
criteria of the 30% threshold and deductibles, and if there was a declaration of calamity by 
the government for the (single or multi-)peril or yield oriented products. The 30% 
thresholds and deductibles wouldn’t be a big problem for income and for peril/yield based 
insurance products with high risks. However, for the support of crop insurance products, 
the need of an official declaration would be a hindering constraint. Crop insurance would 
not be compatible with the Green box with its current definition. 
Criteria related to the behaviour of the private sector.  
•  A high proportion of farmers should be expected to buy the insurances at medium-long 
term. There is a high uncertainty level on this criterion. Some studies report that farmer’s 
behaviour does not always conform to theory and that there is a need to better understand 
farmers’ attitude toward risk and the way they adjust their farm operations (MOREDDU, 
OCDE, 2001, MEUWISSEN ET AL. 1999, MC CARTHY, 1998). Mentality of farmers often 
evolves slowly. In the US, the system started in 1938 and only in the last years it has 
reached a high level of penetration (74% of insurable production value). In Spain (law 
approved in 1978), the system offers a wide range of subsidized options for all types of 
crops, but the penetration is still less than 30%. 
•  Acceptable to insurers/re-insurers: Support to insurances systems should be always 
welcome by the insurance sector. But there are two points to take into account: Some 
insurance products (index insurance, yield insurance, revenue insurance) are not developed 
because of the systemic character of risks (need of public support for re-insurance).   17
Second, a common system would involve a cost for the companies to adapt to it. The 
insurance sector seems to back the coexistence of national systems rather than the 
implementation of a single EU system.  
Technical criteria 
•  Meet the needs of farmers: The analysis of income variability with FADN data shows a 
heterogeneous geographic pattern of the need for income stabilisation tools, depending on 
farm types and farm sizes. The available range of existing insurance is generally 
insufficient to smooth significant income reduction in bad years.  
•  Cost: The possible amount of premiums of an EU-supported insurance system has been 
roughly quantified for a few hypothetical scenarios, under given assumptions (penetration 
of insurance of 40% - 60% and average premium rates). Yield insurance for field crops 
(cereals, oil seeds, sugar beets, and fodder on arable land) could represent a volume of 
premiums between 1 B€-1.4 B€. An EU-wide system for fruits with similar characteristics 
to the existing systems in Spain, Italy or Austria could mean 500 M€ to 900 M€ premiums. 
A similar amount (500 M€ to 800 M€) might be involved in a potential system for 
vegetables. An area-index insurance for cereals could lead to 450 M€ to 750M€, while an 
area-index insurance for a reduction of more than 10% of the average income for specific 
farm types in FADN regions might correspond to 2-3 B€. In this case we have included 
livestock farms that have not been considered in the other quantified scenarios. It should be 
stressed that these quantifications have been made with assumptions that do not necessarily 
match the choices of a hypothetical political decision. More focussed quantifications are 
needed when/if such possible scenarios are better defined. For the budgetary impact, 
additional assumptions are required on the subsidy rate. If we assume for example a 50% 
subsidy, shared between the Member State and the CAP, the budgetary impact on the CAP 
would be 25% of the mentioned figures.  
•  Feasibility/simplicity of control systems to avoid malfunctioning. If a risk management 
program would be introduced as compulsory tool (parallelism with the cross-compliance), 
MS would be probably responsible to create risk information programs. Potential fraud by 
farmers would be controlled by insurance companies that would be the first losers in case 
of fraud.  
•  Technical feasibility and database information availability. In theory, any system that 
exists in one country can always be applied in others. However, some insurance products 
require databases that are not always available. For example the US approach to revenue 
insurance requires historical yield data at the farm level that are not available in most EU 
countries. 
•  Asymmetric information: potential adverse selection, moral hazard or other problems. The 
farmer knows better the own risk level than the insurance company, and it can happen that 
only farmers with a high level of risk buy the insurance. Consequently the risk in the 
insured population is higher than the average. To limit this problem, detailed databases are 
necessary. The possible public support to build such databases should be discussed.  
•  Have advantages compared with alternative tools: Insurance provides farmers with a legal 
title to get compensation compared to ad-hoc payments from the public sector. It also 
provides a quicker payment of compensations, the average time of payment being of 
around 2 months while ad-hoc aid can take 1-2 years. Private insurance probably gives 
indemnities more adjusted to the farmers’ real losses, on an individual basis, because the 
insurance company tries to optimize the own profit. Subsidizing agricultural insurance is a 
way to stabilize the budgetary impact on the public sector and to provide farmers a means 
to manage their own risk management strategies. From an economical point of view it 
seems that it is easier to plan a financial support to insurance premiums, than to make 
public ex-post payments for compensation after natural disasters. However, critical views   18
support that the global cost of insurances is higher because of the cost of loss adjustment, 
and that subsidizing agricultural insurances means subsidizing insurance companies. 
Another point of view holds that with a public system (ad-hoc aids), the Administration is 
in charge of damage assessment, etc. Supporting an insurance system transfers this 
responsibility to the companies that have a profit in compensation of this service. For 
example, in the US, the profit of companies ranges from -30 M$ to 400M$/year with an 
average of around 200 M$/year in a program with a total cost of approx. 4000 M$/year. In 
the case of mutual insurance (insurance companies partially or totally owned by the 
farmers and not focused on profit maximization, for example in Austria) most of the profit 
has to be used as reserves for bad years and even given back to the farmers when these 
reserves reach a maximum level. 
 
8 Conclusions 
This study highlights the high diversity of agricultural insurance systems in the EU. The level 
of risk is also very heterogeneous from country to country, from one farm type to another and 
from small to large farms. The development of agricultural insurances in each country is 
linked to the needs (risk level), but the MS policy to support the system is also a decisive 
factor. For non-systemic risks (hail), private sector offers suitable insurances, but for 
insurance products offering a wide coverage, there is a direct relationship between 
development and public support. The development of insurances in the livestock sector is 
generally lower than in the crop sector. Livestock risk management relies on sanitary 
assistance programs; major crises (diseases with high externalities) are covered by public 
aids.  
Climatic risk analysis has been undertaken, but it still needs to be improved to derive solid 
conclusions at the appropriate scale (farm level or comparable geographical level).  
The total amount of premiums in the EU agricultural insurances is around 1.5 B€ with a 
public subsidy of approximately 500 M€. The average amount of compensations for losses by 
farmers is close to 1.1 B€. The total amount of ad-hoc aids for which we could collect data is 
slightly above 900 M€, but many countries did not provide data on ad-hoc aids for livestock. 
Therefore this figure is probably strongly underestimated.  
Some hypothetical scenarios of EU-wide insurances have been quantified, but the level of 
uncertainty is very high. Some feedback on the possible EU decisions is necessary to reduce 
the uncertainty.    19
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 Annex 1:  Livestock insurance products 
Country  Insurance product name  Products covered  Risks covered 
Austria  “Grassland”  Grassland and silo foils  Hail, flood 
  “Livestock”  Cattle  Stillbirth and death (epidemic disease excluded) 
Bulgaria  “Livestock” (Combined)  Cows and buffalos, sheep, goats, poultry  Death and compulsory slaughter from: fire and natural catastrophes; 
parasitic and infectious diseases (OIE list B & others) 
Czech 
Republic 
“Livestock insurance”  Livestock  Contagious  diseases, death by electrical injury, flood, poisoning, 
overheating, individual losses (non infectious) 
Denmark  “Aggregated insurance”   Acreage and crops, livestock, operating 
equipment and buildings. 
For livestock: Fire, theft, water, operating losses, accident and a few 
diseases (such as botulism) 
Estonia  “Cattle insurance”  Cattle  Fire and natural disaster, accident, theft, diseases 
Finland  Salmonella insurance 
(group insurance) 
Pigs, poultry, hatcheries, milk and beef 
cattle 
Damage covered include costs due to eradication of salmonella and 
losses in production for a period of six months 
  Group insurance for pig 
diseases 
Pigs  Salmonella, PRRS (porcine reproductive and respiratory disease 
syndrome), enzootic pneumonia, swine dysentery, scab, and 
atrophic rhinitis  
  Livestock insurance  Livestock  -Death of an insured animal 
-Severe illness or accident, which according to a veterinary specialist, 
results in the inevitable and premature culling of the animal 
- Animal is lost or stolen for a longer time period than one month 
- Emergency slaughter 
- Accident insurance for cows covers damages due accident 
Etc. 
Germany  “Livestock” n.a.  n.a. 
Greece  “Public livestock” (is not 
insurance) 
All farm animals (voluntary for pigs % 
poultry) 
Climatic, wild animals, diseases (long list) 
  “Private  livestock”  Bovines, poultry (also sheep-goats & pigs 
available) 
All risk mortality   21 




“Natural disaster and 
elemental loss livestock 
insurance” 
Cattle, swine, sheep, goat, horse, goose, 
chicken, hen, turkey, galeeny, pheasant, 
mallard 
Fire, thunder stroke, storm, hail, flood, earthquake, landslip, stonefall, 
earthfall, cave of an unknown hole, breakdown of water and steam pipes. 
schemes 
tailored to the 
demands of 
customers 
“Cost completive livestock 
insurance” 
Cattle, swine, sheep, goat, horse, goose, 
chicken, hen, turkey, galeeny, pheasant, 
mallard 
Extra costs deriving from diseases are covered. Coverable diseases: BSE, 
food and mouth disease, aphthous stomatitis, oriental rinderpest, cattle 
infectious lung inflammation, Rift valley fever, blue-tongue disease, lyssa, 
SVD, African swine plague, infectious swine paralysis. 
are available  “Insurance of high value 
horses” 
High value horses   
Ireland  “Farm  insurance”  Among other farm items and products, 
covers optionally livestock in transit, 
pedigree livestock, etc.  
Fire, lighting, storms, floods, attack of dogs on sheep 
Italy  “Stock Farms”  Cattle and buffalo (value, cost disposing of 
animals, lack of revenue for period of farm 
stoppage) 
FMD, brucellosis, pleuropneumonia, tuberculosis and enzootic leukosis  
Latvia  “Livestock insurance”  Cattle, Sheep, Goat, Horses, Pigs, Fur 
animals, Bees, Poultry 
Disease, Accidents, Damages caused by natural disasters, Fire, Flash of 
lighting , Explosion, Illegal activities of third parties 
Lithuania  “Livestock insurance”  Livestock, horses, sheep, goats, pigs; 
several companies also include bees, birds, 
fishes 
Non-communicable diseases, Infectious diseases, Natural forces or 
accidents, Theft or vandalism 
Poland  “Livestock”  Cattle, horses swine (separate ins. for fur-
bearing animals, apiary, fish also exist) 
Death & forced slaughter due to non-epidemic diseases, accidents, and 
natural events 
Romania  “Livestock insurance”  Animals, birds, bees, fish  Surgical diseases, obstetrics and internal diseases, wild animal 
attacks, fire, thunderstorm 
Slovenia  “Animal insurance”  Animals  Ruin from disease or accident, emergency slaughter, slaughter from 
economic reasons 
Spain  “Livestock farms” 
Cattle, Horses, Sheep-goats  
Poultry 
For cattle: accidents and epizooties 
For poultry: accidents, asphyxia and panic  
 “Dead  animals  disposal” 
Cattle, Horses, Sheep-goats, Pigs 
Poultry, Rabbits 
All disposal costs   22 
Country  Insurance product name  Products covered  Risks covered 
 “Index  insurance” 
Cattle, Horses, Sheep-goats 
Apiculture 
Increase of feeding costs. 
Apiculture: also fire, flood and rains 
Sweden  Animal insurance  Cattle, sheep, pigs, deer  Slaughter, death, theft (optional add-ins: veterinary treatment; milk 
production breakdown due to viral diarrhoea) 
United 
Kingdom  Livestock insurance  Livestock  Foot and Mouth Disease, Tuberculosis, Brucellosis, Classical Swine Fever 
Croatia  Livestock insurance  Livestock  Death due illness or accident, emergency slaughtering, euthanasia 
Turkey  Livestock life insurance 
(since 2006)  Dairy cows 
All types of accidents, natural disasters, fire or explosion and all diseases, 
pregnancy, birth or surgical operations. Contagious diseases compulsory to 
declare are excluded  
  Poultry life insurance  Poultry produced in closed systems 
(chicken/hens, turkeys, ostrich) 
All types of accidents, natural disasters, fire or explosion and all types of 
poultry diseases. Contagious diseases compulsory to declare are excluded 
Source: BIELZA ET AL., 2006 
 
Annex 2:  Aquaculture insurance products 
Country  Insurance type  Products covered  Risks covered 
Greece  Private aquaculture  All fish. Additional: for fish stock in transit, equipment, vessels, etc.  All risk mortality, theft, escape over 
Lithuania  Livestock insurance  Several companies also include bees, birds, fishes   
Poland  Livestock insurance  Apiary and fish coverage also exist   
Romania  Livestock insurance  Also covers birds, bees, fish   
Spain  “Aquaculture” 
Meterologic exceptional happenings, chemic pollution, lighting, sea 
storm, flood, oil spill. 
Additional guarantees: diseases 
Gilthead bream, bass, turbot, meager, trout, 
mussel 
Turkey  Aquaculture    
Source: BIELZA ET AL., 2006 